2016考研英語經(jīng)濟學人熱點：沙特跟老美 別扭扭

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Saudi Arabia and the United States

沙特跟老美

Awkward relations

別扭扭

The American president and the Saudi king will havean unusually edgy meeting

美國總統(tǒng)與沙特國王將展開一次絕無僅有的緊張會談

BARACK OBAMA may recall a tricky moment when hefirst met King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia five years ago. Bending to shake hands with theoctogenarian monarch, the taller American appeared to bow deeply. Republican snipers inAmerica gleefully blasted the president for “kowtowing” to rich Arabs. Such protocols should runmore smoothly when Mr Obama heads to Saudi Arabia on March 28th for his second time inoffice. Unfortunately, however, relations between the two countries have seldom been moreawkward.

巴拉克·奧巴馬可能會想起5年前一個頗為微妙的一幕，時值他與沙特國王阿卜杜拉首次會晤。盡管比阿卜杜拉高，奧巴馬還是深深地彎腰與這位年過八旬的君主握手。國內(nèi)眼尖的共和黨人很愉悅的指責奧巴馬向阿拉伯富豪“磕頭”。二次執(zhí)政，奧巴馬會把這樣的外交禮儀在28日會見沙特國王時做的更自然，但不幸的是，兩國關(guān)系幾乎沒有像現(xiàn)在這般別扭過。

Their close alliance dates to the end of the second world war, when an ailing Franklin Rooseveltmet Saudi Arabia's founding king, Abdul Aziz, aboard the cruiser Quincy in the Suez Canal.Then, and for decades after, the equation was simple: America would provide security, theSaudis oil. Those shared interests, cemented by a mutual loathing of communism (and a morerecently shared hatred of Iran's Shia theocracy and of al-Qaeda terrorists), papered overinevitable differences between a hermetic autocracy, backed by fearsomely puritanicalWahhabist clerics, and an ebullient, proselytising democracy.

親密的美沙聯(lián)盟關(guān)系還得追溯到二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束，羅斯福帶病與現(xiàn)代沙特的建國者阿齊茲在蘇伊士運河的巡航艦Quincy號上會見。自那之后的幾十年，等價交換顯而易見：美國保證沙特國防安全，沙特給美供油。那些因彼此都不滿于社會主義(如今則是對伊朗什葉派政權(quán)和基地恐怖分子更為強烈的仇恨)而緊密聯(lián)系在一起的共同利益掩蓋了彼此之間的不可避免差異：一個是封閉的專制國家，由膽小而具有清教特色的瓦哈比教派牧師所支持，一個是熱情奔放，令人改變信仰的民主國家。

Such differences have inexorably widened since the end of the cold war, a process that hasaccelerated since Mr Obama took office. The reasons are not hard to find. For a start, surgingoil production at home has sharply lessened America's dependence on Saudi oil, even as MrObama's determination to extract American forces from such quagmires as Iraq andAfghanistan has been reducing the American bootprint in the region.

兩國間那些不可避免的分歧于冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后擴大，又自奧巴馬執(zhí)政以來加快。原因很簡單。首先，美國石油自產(chǎn)量的飆升緩和了對沙特石油的依賴性。盡管奧巴馬關(guān)于從伊拉克，阿富汗撤軍的決定減少了美在中東地區(qū)的腳印。

At the same time America's pursuit, with its European allies, of a nuclear deal with Iran hasexposed underlying differences. America sees the problem primarily as one of nuclearproliferation and secondarily as a threat to Israel. The Saudis instead fear Iran as a subversiveregional rival, geopolitically in unstable countries such as Iraq and Syria, and ideologically as aShia power challenging the Saudis' fundamentalist Sunni creed. Despite the slowness ofprogress in nuclear talks and the legacy of deep mistrust between America and Iran, Saudiofficials openly fret that America could “sell them out” for the lure of an historicrapprochement with a power they see as intrinsically hostile.

同時，美國及其歐洲盟友尋求與伊朗進行核商談的愿望也暴露了潛在的分歧。在美國看來，伊朗問題首先屬于核擴散問題。其次，威脅到了以色列。而沙特擔心的是，從地緣政治角度來看，伊朗會是中東地區(qū)發(fā)生的又一政權(quán)顛覆(推翻的是像阿卜杜拉這樣的獨裁者)，就像之前動蕩不安的伊拉克和敘利亞。從意識形態(tài)來看，什葉派的權(quán)力威脅到了沙特信奉正統(tǒng)基督教的遜尼派。雖然美伊之間的核對話進展緩慢，彼此的互不信任也由來已久，沙特官員還是公開表示了他們的焦慮，擔心美國會為了與強權(quán)間的歷史性和解這一誘惑而“賣了他們”，盡管沙特人生而仇恨這一強權(quán)。

Other differences, too, are brewing. Unable now to rely so much on American might, thekingdom's rulers have taken to a more aggressive pursuit of their own regional interests.Widely cheered in the West, the outbreak of the Arab spring in 2011 was viewed with dismayand alarm in the Saudi capital, Riyadh. With scarcely a nod to the White House, Saudi troopsintervened in the neighbouring statelet of Bahrain to rescue its king from a pro-democracyuprising by his majority-Shia subjects. While America welcomed the election of the MuslimBrotherhood's Muhammad Morsi as president of Egypt as a step towards democracy, theSaudis viewed it as a power grab by an Islamist cult, financed by another impertinentneighbour, Qatar, whose noisy Al Jazeera satellite TV channel has long disturbed the royalSaudis' sleep. In recent weeks Saudi Arabia has dismayed America, which has long urgedgreater co-operation between Iran's Arab neighbours, by pulling its ambassador out of Qatar.

其他方面的分歧也在慢慢醞釀中。沙特無法像以往一樣依賴美國，國王便采取了更為激進的方式來尋求自身利益。11年阿拉伯之春爆發(fā)，西方國家廣而叫好，而沙特首都利雅得卻不得不沮喪地視之為警告。沙特軍隊加入小鄰居巴林島，從多數(shù)什葉派組織支持民主的起義中救出其君主，可見沙特幾乎不向白宮點頭表示贊同。美方支持兄弟會的穆爾西當選埃及總統(tǒng)，以此作為向民主的邁進，而沙特將其當做是伊斯蘭狂熱份子奪權(quán)，并由另一個魯莽的鄰居卡塔爾出資援助。卡塔爾的Al Jazeera衛(wèi)星電視頻道一直吵到沙特王室的好眠。最近幾周，沙特一直讓美國不好受，因為美方將沙特大使逐出卡塔爾，以求與伊朗的阿拉伯鄰居間更為緊密的合作。

The Saudi rulers see the Brotherhood, with its cells inside the kingdom itself and powerfulfellow-travellers in countries such as Turkey and Tunisia, as a threat from within Sunni Islam.Small wonder that they have strongly backed its foes, from the Egyptian generals whooverthrew Mr Morsi last year, to Syrian rebel factions that have quietly sidelined the oncedominant Brothers from Syria's exiled opposition. Bruce Riedel, an American counter-terrorexpert, quotes Saudi officials as saying that the kingdom spent $25 billion subsidising suchallies as Jordan, Pakistan and Bahrain in 2012, and expects to spend more, now that Egypt hasbecome a prime recipient of such largesse.

沙特統(tǒng)治者將兄弟會，及其在沙特境內(nèi)的政治組織和一些處在土耳其、突尼斯等國強大的同路人視為伊斯蘭遜尼派的一大威脅。難怪他們極力支持了兄弟會的敵對方，不管是去年幫助埃及軍方推翻穆爾西，還是為敘利亞反派組織出力，不動聲色地將曾經(jīng)主宰一方的兄弟會從敘利亞流亡的反對派中逐出。美國反暴行專家布魯斯·里德爾引用沙特官方的話說，沙特王國于2012年耗費250億美元讓約旦，巴基斯坦以及巴林島等國平息下來，既然埃及已經(jīng)成為這類援助的首要接受者，沙特將投入更多。

Much of this aid does not necessarily flout America's wishes but, even where interestscoincide, friction can arise. Such as in Syria, where joint Saudi-CIA plans to supply anti-government rebels have consistently stumbled against what Saudi operatives view as quibblingAmerican qualms. The halting nature of such supplies, the Saudis complain, has emboldenedIslamist extremists who have more regular sources of funding and weapons and weakened theAmerican-backed political opposition. Last August, when Syria's president, Bashar Assad, wascaught red-handed gassing his own people in their hundreds, the Saudis saw a goldenopportunity to strike hard. Mr Obama instead shrank back, apparently satisfied with thenarrower aim of eliminating Mr Assad's chemical weapons.

這類幫助并不特意藐視美國的期望，但只要沙特與別國利益一致，與美的摩擦就會產(chǎn)生。例如在敘利亞，沙特與中情局聯(lián)盟給反政方提供援助這一計劃就一致給沙特傭兵眼中的美國刺兒刺兒的不安再添堵。沙方抱怨這樣猶豫不決的援助助長了擁有更常規(guī)資金和武器資源的伊斯蘭極端分子的勇氣，也削弱了美方支持的政治反對派。去年8月，敘利亞總統(tǒng)巴沙爾·阿薩德被發(fā)現(xiàn)手染鮮血以毒氣處理數(shù)以百計的國人，沙特看到了一個絕妙的機會來進行更有力的打擊。而相比之下，奧巴馬退縮了，明顯滿意于消除阿薩德化武的小小目標。

Despite this growing list of grievances on both sides, the two countries need each other.America retains a strong military presence in the Gulf, and cannot be replaced as the ultimateguarantor of Saudi security in the foreseeable future. In the midst of turmoil across theregion, and with the threat of jihadist terrorism ever-present, America still relies heavily on theSaudis as the leading local policeman.

盡管美沙雙方的怨氣都不斷增加，但還是需要對方。美國在海灣駐留一支強大的軍隊，在可預見的一段時間里也不可能變?yōu)樯程匕踩�最終的保障者。在暴亂在中東地區(qū)蔓延過程中，面對長期的圣戰(zhàn)恐怖主義，美國還是很依賴沙特作為當?shù)刂饕�的警察�?/font>